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Palle Rasmussen, November 2020 
 
Friedrich Engels on European disarmament 
 
In several of his late writings, Engels emphasizes the devastating consequences of war with 
modern technology between militarized states. One example is his preface to a book by the 
German socialist Sigismund Borkheim, published in 1888, in which he gives a gloomy and 
prophetic description of future war: 
 
Finally, the only war left for Prussia-Germany to wage will be a world war, a world war, moreover, 
of an extent and violence hitherto unimagined. Eight to ten million soldiers will be at each other's 
throats and in the process they will strip Europe barer than a swarm of locusts. The depredations of 
the Thirty Years' War compressed into three to four years and extended over the entire continent; 
famine, disease, the universal lapse into barbarism, both of the armies and the people, in the wake 
of acute misery; irretrievable dislocation of our artificial system of trade, industry and credit, 
ending in universal bankruptcy; collapse of the old states and their conventional political wisdom to 
the point where crowns will roll into the gutters by the dozen and no one will be around to pick 
them up; the absolute impossibility of foreseeing how it will all end and who will emerge as victor 
from the battle. Only one consequence is absolutely certain: universal exhaustion and the creation 
of the conditions for the ultimate victory of the working class. That is the prospect for the moment 
when the systematic development of mutual one-upmanship in armaments reaches its climax and 
finally brings forth its inevitable fruits (Marx & Engels Collected Works, vol. 26, p. 451). 
 
Although Engels here refers to "the possible victory of the working class", the description does not 
contain much optimism. The framework for eventual victory will be ruined societies and degraded 
populations. This is not the way Engels wants to build new socialist forms of society and 
community. 
 
Such predictions about the nature and consequences of future war in Europe naturally raised the 
question if it was possible to avoid this development. Engels also grappled with this, most clearly 
in a series of articles published in the newspaper "Vorwärts" in March 1893, at the same time as 
the defense budget was discussed in the German Reichstag. The articles were immediately 
published as a pamphlet entitled "Can Europe disarm?" In the preface to the booklet, Engels 
writes: 
 
I proceed from the assumption that is increasingly gaining general acceptance: that the system of 
standing armies has been carried to such extremes throughout Europe that it must either bring 
economic ruin to the peoples on account of the military burden, or else degenerate into a general 
war of extermination, unless the standing armies are transformed in good time into a militia based 
on the universal arming of the people (Marx & Engels Collected Works, vol. 27, p. 371). 
 
At the time, the idea of disarmament was not widespread. Peace movements were emerging and 
were also being linked with the socialist working class movement, as shown for instance by the 
establishment in Britain of the “Workmen’s Peace Association” in 1870. However, the main 
demand of the peace movements was the introduction of legally based arbitration as a way of 
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solving conflicts between nations without war. Another way of limiting warfare, which had been 
used by governments on a few occasions, was the prohibition of the use of especially dangerous 
weapons such as poisoned bullets. But disarmament, where governments in peacetime agree to 
reduce their military capacity in certain ways, was a relatively new idea. The first Hague 
conference, where governments negotiated both international peaceful arbitration and 
disarmament, only took place in 1899.  
   
In the beginning of the pamphlet, Engels briefly describes the growth of armament in Europe. He 
points out that the larger states, especially Germany, France and Russia, seek to outdo each other 
in military power and military readiness. In this arms and power race, it may seem foolish to talk 
about disarmament; but the classes of the peoples who will primarily have to supply the soldiers 
and pay the taxes are everywhere calling for disarmament. Engels argues that it is possible to 
disarm, and thus to guarantee peace, and he even claims that it can be done relatively easily if 
Germany takes the initiative and shows the way. 
 
After the war between Germany and France in 1870-71, compulsory military service in various 
forms has been adopted by all European countries. Engels sees this as a positive development; an 
army that mainly recruits soldiers among married middle-aged men is less offensive than an army 
with an emphasis on recruited professional soldiers. However, the situation is marked by the 
sharpened political tensions and the arms race between Germany and France, which gradually 
also involves Russia, Austria and Italy. As part of the race, the countries have begun to extend their 
military service and recruit more and more young recruits. 
 
Engels emphasizes that the revolutionary nature of the German compulsory service system is the 
requirement that all armed men must be able to contribute to the country's defense throughout 
the phase of life where they are physically capable of it. That principle neither can nor should be 
questioned. But it is possible to lay down rules for the length of active service time. This is where 
Engels sees the possibility of disarmament:   
 
International regulation, by the great powers of the Continent, of the maximum term of active 
service with the colours of all arms of the service, initially for two years, as far as I am concerned – 
but with the proviso of an immediate further reduction as soon as people are convinced of the 
possibility, and with the militia system as the ultimate objective (Marx & Engels Collected Works, 
vol. 27, p. 374). 
 
From a present-day perspective, this proposal for disarmament may seem surprising. The 
international agreements on disarmament during the 20th century generally focused not on the 
length of military service or the number of soldiers, but on limiting the size, the destructive 
potential and the number of weapons. Important examples are the navel treaties of the 1920ies 
and 1930es, which limited the size and number of different types of warships, and the nuclear 
disarmament treaties following the cold war period. However, Engels focuses on the length of 
military service as a way of controlling the size of armies and limiting the military’s independence 
as a social and political power.     
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Engels argues that the length of service is crucial to an army's combat capability. If an international 
upper limit on the length of service is successfully agreed, the relative ratio of the fighting power 
of the armies will be maintained at its current level. 
 
If the length of service is not more than two years, the armies will be forced to use the time 
effectively. Military training will have to concentrate on the essentials and it will become evident 
how little time it actually takes to turn a well-developed young man into a soldier. As Engels also 
argued in other writings (for instance his 1865 pamphlet “The Prussian Military Question and the 
German Worker’s Party”), the rules of military training are full of obsolescent provisions and ideas 
that discipline must be learned through meaningless activities. Just the abolition of the parade 
march would make several weeks available for rational training.  
 
The duration of the period of service must be seen in the context of young people's education. 
Engels emphasizes that schools in Prussia are usually equipped with tools for physical training 
(bars, racks, etc.), and these tools should be used systematically so that the young people have 
gymnastics both freely and in formation, while muscles and bodies are still agile. He argues that It 
is foolish to first let the muscles and bones of young adults stiffen and then have to train them 
again in the military service. Furthermore, boys can well be trained in military movement patterns, 
in groups and formations, as part of schooling. Participating in field marches and exercises is not 
only good for young men's bodies, it also develops their intelligence and enable them to complete 
a military education relatively quickly. Engels’ argument here is of course controversial. On one 
hand, physical activity as part of schooling is generally a good thing, and in the school context 
young people are less exposed to military ideology. On the other hand, training military 
formations in school may establish a platform for military ideology in the education system.    
 
After presenting the military arguments for the requirement of a maximum of two years' service, 
Engels discusses the political possibilities of having this implemented through international 
agreements. 
 
Russia is one of the great European powers involved in the arms and power race. The first 
impression will be that Russia - with a population of over 200 million – must be crucial for a 
European agreement on the length of service. However, Engels argues that for military as well as 
economic reasons Russia can be disregarded. He points out that that a military based on 
compulsory military service presupposes a certain economic and intellectual development. If these 
preconditions are lacking, the system does more harm than good - and that, according to Engels, is 
the situation in Russia. Russian soldiers are undoubtedly brave, but they are completely 
dependent on the close social and working communities that exist in the rural municipalities and 
in the smaller towns. This dependence on the community allows Russian soldiers to fight in closed 
formations of infantry, but not in situations that require individual assessment and initiative. And 
modern warfare, with increasingly effective firearms, requires organization into smaller and more 
flexible groups, where soldiers must continually assess options for action. Furthermore, Engels 
points out that Russia has too few officers because the officer group is recruited only from the 
nobility and the bourgeois families of the cities, and this constitutes a minimal part of the 
country's population. 
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In addition to Russia's military weakness, the economic and social situation in the country is 
depressing. The liberalization of agriculture and the subsequent development of capitalist large-
scale industry have undermined Russia's stability. The nobility has made money selling wood from 
the forests, but is more and more indebted. The peasants have poorer land than before and are 
burdened by heavy taxes and not least by the fact that they are now obliged to pay taxes in cash 
rather than in kind. The ruthless de-forestation undertaken by the nobility has reduced the quality 
of the arable land, so that the harvest yield falls, the export of wheat stops and famine spreads. 
The economy of Russian agriculture is in deep crisis. And since the peasants make up almost nine-
tenths of Russia's population, the country is also in crisis. The Russian state, including the military, 
depends heavily on foreign loans, and the country's creditworthiness is eroding. 
 
According to Engels, Russia has neither the military nor the economic power that the size and 
population of the country could indicate. Therefore, the country's participation is not essential for 
a European agreement on military service. 
 
Against this background, Engels discusses whether a proposal a maximum of two years' 
compulsory military service is likely to be accepted by the other powers on the European 
mainland. He assumes that Germany, as the strongest military power in Europe, has the basis for 
making the proposal. But what will be the reactions if Germany makes this proposal to Austria, 
Italy and France? Engels believes that both Austria and Italy will be positive. The Austrian army 
already has many proponents of shorter service, and Italy is under heavy economic pressure from 
high military budgets. 
 
France will have a crucial position. Engels argues that he proposed limitations will not impair 
France's military position. Compulsory service on the Prussian model is a relatively new system in 
France and that will make it easier to reform the system. Also, the school system is currently being 
reformed, and this may strengthen the physical conditions of young people, and thus their military 
potential. If France signs and ratifies an agreement on the maximum duration of military service, it 
will come into force, even though revanchist currents towards Germany may lead to unrest and 
certain breaches of the agreement. Germany can afford to be generous because it is still far ahead 
of France in military strength.  
 
It is also possible that the chauvinist sentiments may prevail and lead France to reject the 
proposal. Engels argues that even if that were to happen it would be a great advantage for 
Germany to have put forward the proposal. The initiative will break with the image of Germany as 
expansionist, militaristic and untrustworthy established through the many years’ of Bismarck’s 
regime. Germany will show a new side, emerge as a peacemaking nation. Germany will gain 
confidence among other countries, not least England; and England will play a crucial role in a 
future war, because the British navy can control the supply lines between France and Russia. 
 
Against this background, Engels concludes that Germany must have the courage to propose a 
maximum of two years' compulsory military service, thus initiating disarmament in Europe.  
 
As we now know, this is not what happened. But Engels’ proposal and arguments, although 
unrealistic in some respects, are interesting and in many ways consistent.  
